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SOME ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON BARGAINING
The most cursory survey of the literature devoted to the bargaining problem is sufficient to impress one with the enormous diversity of opinion on the nature and function of bargaining processes. (1) Most simply, bargaining may be nothing more than a charade. According to this view, the parties have a common (although unstated) understanding of what the final agreement will be, and the elaborate sequence of bids and counterbids, threats, strikes, and other uses of force has as its sole purpose the gratification (or appeasement) of third parties. This interpretation is often applied to labor negotiations in industries which have long histories of experience with unionism. In 1947, Lemuel Boulware, negotiating opposite the Electrical Workers Union on behalf of the General Electric Company, argued that both parties fully understood what the final settlement would be, and maintained that all of the intervening bargaining was nothing more than an expensive fraud During that negotiation, and subsequently during the 1950s and the early 1960s, General Electric outlined to the union what it expected the agreement to be and refused to move from that position unless the union succeeded in presenting previously unknown &dquo;facts&dquo; which altered GE's forecast of the course of an ordinary negotiation. During this period, General Electric suffered a series of long and expensive strikes, and many observers believed these to have been occasioned by the disappointment and hostility which this policy generated among union members who were not granted the concessions from initial positions which had become traditional. Indeed, Boulwarism has often been characterized as an unfair labor practice, not because of any obvious bias in the estimated agreement points (the proposed settlements were often generous), but because it is seen as an attempt to discredit union leaders in the eyes of the membership. In effect, it denies to these leaders the opportunity to appear to their constituents as having squeezed concessions out of reluctant employers, thus resulting in a severe political liability for them. 
THE FOCUS OF THIS PAPER
We have described a negotiation as a combination of searching, dividing, game-playing, and fraud. To put all these together into one paper is certainly more than we can accomplish, and, indeed, the emphasis here will remain on the traditional question of division. The best we will be able to do with respect to these other elements is point out their relevance from time to time in the discussion, leaving, reluctantly, the broader questions to another time.
Since we are to concentrate on the question of division, we will accept the usual assumption that the set of potential agreements (such as the area bounded by abc in Figure 1 ) is known to both parties,and we will put aside the interesting problem of how the payoff possibility set XA ~H(xB) was discovered in the first place. Moreover However, he will discount, quite properly, all such demands which might be put forward by Bill, recognizing them to be similarly costless bluffs. Thus, the information value of these early demands will be seen to be negligible, and the learning process will proceed slowly at best.
As the anticipated settlement dates tn and tB approach, uncertainty will decline and payoff demands will become more reliable indicators of expectations. In the extreme case, the date tn might acutally arrive before Arthur learns of his overoptimism. At tA, however, Arthur will try for his expected payoff xA, and when he is rebuffed, then it will be obvious to him that RB was in error, and adjustments in it will take place. Furthermore, in Figure 3 and a similar one drawn from the point of view of Bill can be used to describe the course of negotiation.
The learning mechanism establishes a dynamic interaction between the two parties' behaviors. Arthur's strategy SA determines the current course of rA, which is used by Bill in the formation of RA. In response to RA, Bill selects strategy SB which determines the course of rB, and this in turn is the basis for Author's estimate RB. It is important to bear in mind that as a consequence of learning, SA and RB may be continually changing, so that what is learned in the form of RA or RB is a composite of a sequence of strategies rather than a single one. From either negotiator's point of view, there is no way to distinguish changing strategies from the mechanisms of an invariant one. Arthur may observe rB, but he cannot know whether rB is the outgrowth of learning (he hopes that it is), or the manifestations of some subtile strategy of Bill's.
The choice of bargaining strategy SA is motivated by a desire to maximize Un (SA, SB). This utility value is not dependent solely on the settlement payoff, however, for it also reflects the costs of time delay before a settlement is reached, and the losses which may be suffered because of various attempts to use force or coercion. The selection SA reflects a trade-off between these opposing values. If the cost of time delay is small, SA will reflect a willingness to wait in the interests of achieving a large settlement; if the cost is large, SA will reflect a willingness to sacrifice some payoff for the sake of early agreement. Thus if Arthur views his prospects optimistically (Bill is seen to be conceding rapidly, or to be making small demands), the anticipated time cost of negotiating is reduced (because the delay will be shorter) and SA will be designed to achieve a larger payoff at settlement time. If RB is seen to include the use of force, even if the date for that force has not yet arrived, SA will be designed to reduce the cost of that force, partly through the use of countermeasures, but also partly through reductions in the final payoff expectations.
Even in this most general model, a number of conclusions may be drawn immediately.
(1) The negotiation will take more time than either party initially expected.
(2) High time costs, or vulnerability to coercion will reduce a party's settlement payoff.
(3) The use of force or coercion which increases the cost of delays in agreement will reduce the duration of the negotiation. (4) If a party's learning rate is high, for whatever reason, the duration of the negotiation will be reduced.
(5) If a party's learning rate is high, for whatever reason, that party will receive a smaller payoff at settlement time than he would otherwise. (6) There is a central tendency in the bargaining process which reduces any asymmetries in the parties' expectations which are not reflections of differences in learning rates, utility functions, or in the availability of means for altering the outcome through the use of force.
Some of these six conclusions are not very startling. Conclusion 1 is obtained directly from our discussion of Figure 3 and is no more than a reflection of our description of the general case of bargaining as one in which both parties are overoptimistic. Conclusions 2 and 3 are equally straightforward and are obtained from our description of the utility function. If, due to high bargaining costs, a party lowers his payoff expectations whatever the value of RB, then, even with the learning process, rA as drawn in Figure 3 will be lower at every point in time, and Arthur's final payoff wll be reduced. Conclusion 4 is an obvious consequence of the fact that a high learning rate will lead to a more rapid downward shift in expectations, which will lead in turn to a more rapid downward fall in rA. This implication is drawn from the observation that large initial demands will require, at some time or other, large apparent concessions which will slow the other party's learning.
(9) Political negotiations will take more time than economic negotiations. This may sometimes be the case simply because the passage of time is of less concern to the parties, but it may be expected also because political issues are less well defined than are economic issues, and the presence of easily quantifiable variables contributes to rapid learning. 
